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rational was to increase job creation in a context of high firing costs that were 
politically hard to decrease. Temporary contracts have become a prevalent 
labor market institution in many countries, and with hindsight it seems 
uncontroversial that they have failed at decreasing unemployment. Evidence 
indicates that temporary contracts not only increases unemployment 
fluctuations, but also unemployment levels. In this paper we argue that the 
rational for the introduction of temporary contracts is flawed at its root. We 
provide a novel explanation of why temporary contracts can increase 
unemployment even in a context where a reduction of firing costs would 
actually reduce unemployment. We argue that, if minimum wages are kept at 
high levels, temporary contracts have an effect not unlike the increase of 
unemployment benefits. By increasing the flows in and out of unemployment 
into relatively highly paid temporary jobs (minimum wage), they increase the 
value of being unemployed. This has a negative effect on incentives, 
increases wages and reduces the willingness of firms to create employment. 
We present empirical evidence supportive of some of the implications of the 
model. 
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1970s, Europe has had much higher unemployment levels and duration than the
US. At the same time, European labor markets have typically been characterized by a wide use of
permanent contracts with high regulated firing costs.
In the mid-1980s, many European governments attributed the under performance of the labor
market to the existence of high firing costs which were politically diﬃcult to reduce. As a response,
a common way to reform labor markets was to introduce, or extend, in the legislation the figure
of fixed-term (temporary) contracts with negligible firing costs even for non-seasonal jobs.1 Since
their introduction, temporary contracts play an important role in the labor market as they account
for most new hirings2 and are used in all sectors and occupations (OECD, 2002). In addition, the
transition from temporary to permanent contracts is relatively low,3 and more generally the labor
market has become segmented.4 However, despite the intensive use of temporary contracts, these
reforms have not been successful at bringing unemployment down. With hindsight, it seems clear
that not only they have negative eﬀects on the volatility of employment, but also that their eﬀects
on average employment has been negative (see Khan, 2010). Today, while many OECD countries
are facing historical high unemployment rates, firing costs and temporary contracts are back into
the center of the policy debate.
In this paper, we argue that temporary contracts do not need to reduce unemployment even
in a context where a reduction of firing cost would actually reduce it. Thus, the logic for their
introduction was faulty at its root. While our point is very simple, it is a novel explanation on
the eﬀects of temporary contracts whose intuition is as follows. Temporary contracts increase the
flows in the labor market. Thus, unemployed workers know that their probability of accessing a
temporary job is relatively large. In the presence of high minimum wage this translates into an
improvement in their condition, implying that wages increase and the willingness of firms to create
jobs decreases. The eﬀects of temporary contracts are in this context not unlike the eﬀects of
increasing unemployment benefits.
We show that, in a context of eﬃciency wages, temporary contracts could reduce unemployment
only if minimum wages were very low. In such a case they may improve the structure of incentives,
as being a temporary worker with a very low wage is punishment enough, and the threat of dismissal
is an eﬀective deterrent. If, on the other hand, the minimum wage is high, the opposite happens.
The unemployed know that they will access a decent wage fast, and this worsens the eﬀectivity
of dismissal as a deterrent of shirking. Higher wages are the only option that firms face, but this
1See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1993, 1994, 1999 and 2002) for a detailed description of temporary
contracts regulations in Europe.
2 In Spain, between 1986 and 1992, an average of 98% of newly registered contracts were temporary contracts (see
Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). In France, in 1992, 80% of all entries were hirings on temporary contracts (see Goux,
Maurin and Pauchet, 2001).
3See column (4) in Table 2 and OECD (2002).
4See OECD (2002), chart 3.1. For instance, from the mid-80s until 2000, the share of temporary contracts rose
from 11% to 32% in Spain; from 5% to almost 15% in France; from 5% to 10% in Italy.
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decreases the number of jobs that the market can sustain.
There is large and growing literature on the eﬀects of temporary contracts on diﬀerent aspects
of the labor market.5 The traditional answer of why temporary contracts might not reduce unem-
ployment assumes that temporary contracts are equivalent to a reduction in firing costs. Since the
eﬀect of firing costs on aggregate employment is ambiguous (e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), as
they reduce both hirings and firings, so is the impact of introducing of temporary contracts. Few
papers go somehow beyond this point and do not consider temporary contracts as being similar
to lower firing costs, yet the explanations provided in the end are nevertheless not that diﬀerent
from the well-known eﬀects of firing costs.6 We think that this is unsatisfactory as we lack un-
derstanding of why introducing cheaper contracts might fail to boost employment beyond the fact
that these contracts increase both job creation and job destruction. In this paper, we show that
introducing temporary contracts is not equivalent to reducing firing costs and their impact depends
on the interaction with other existing labor market institutions such as the minimum wage. We
provide a new explanation of why temporary contracts might be perverse based on their impact
on cost of providing incentives to workers and the consequences for equilibrium unemployment.
We contribute to the rather scarce theoretical literature on the eﬀects of temporary contracts on
the level of unemployment by providing a new mechanism beyond the eﬀects of these contracts on
labor market flows.
Eﬃciency wage models are best suited to examine the two main diﬀerences between temporary
and permanent contracts, namely, firing costs and contract duration. These models allow to consider
in a simple way a very general specification of employment protection legislation and not just
severance payments.7 Contract duration is an important source of incentives. Introducing an
incentive problem implies that a link between temporary contracts and permanent contracts emerges
endogenously. In our model the instrument that allows the provision of incentives in temporary
contracts is not their wage, but their renewal rate into permanent contracts. In the existing
literature, the link between temporary and permanent contracts has typically been ignored or
assumed exogenous. In most countries, temporary contracts cannot be used continuously and
forever as firms have to convert them into a permanent contract or to fire the worker at their
expiration. The link between temporary and permanent contracts allows to understand that, despite
the introduction of “flexibility at the margin” that temporary contracts represent, these contracts
are nevertheless aﬀected by the unchanged regulations of the labor market. This constraints their
potential to increase employment. In particular, the minimum wage regulation aﬀecting temporary
workers decreases the willingness of firms to create jobs via an endogenous general equilibrium
5See, for example, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), Alonso-Borrego, Fernández-Villaverde and Galdón-
Sánchez (2004), Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2010), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Cabrales and
Hopenhayn (1997), Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010), Saint-Paul (1996) and Wasmer (1999).
6See, for instance, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) for matching models in which
temporary contracts increase both job creation and job destruction and the latter has a larger impact on unemploy-
ment the higher firing costs in permanent contracts are (relative to those in temporary contracts).
7See Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003). In fact, firms seem to complain precisely about the complexity introduced
by such regulation (see Blanchard and Tirole, 2008).
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eﬀect: the increase in value for the unemployed.
In our framework, firing costs imply higher eﬃciency wages for permanent workers and thus
higher unemployment. This makes the problem interesting as lower firing costs would reduce
unemployment yet temporary contracts may fail to improve employment outcomes. In the absence
of a minimum wage, the eﬀects of firing costs could be undone through lower wages of temporary
contracts. Actually, the first best can be restored with low enough temporary wages. Workers
would have to buy their right to a temporary contract by accepting a wage substantially lower than
their productivity. In this case, the value of having a temporary contract would be very low. So
low, that the contract structure would solve the incentive problem eﬀectively and unemployment
would disappear.
However, the presence of a minimum wage distorts this mechanism. Temporary contracts
combined with a high enough minimum wage make the value of being unemployed higher than
in a world with only permanent contracts. In this case, the introduction of temporary contracts
acts in a similar manner as unemployment insurance. This is why. Temporary contracts arrive
fast while permanent contracts imply a longer wait. Taking the level of unemployment as given,
a high minimum wage implies that a large percentage of total income generated is transferred to
temporary workers in the immediate future. The high turnover between temporary contracts and
unemployment implies that it is the unemployed who enjoy such income. Thus, to the extent that
workers discount the future, being unemployed in the presence of temporary contracts is not as bad.
But a higher value of being unemployed makes the incentive problem of the economy worse. This
requires a higher equilibrium unemployment rate in order to discipline workers. The same would
happen with an increase of unemployment benefits. We believe that this is a very useful finding,
as we have a better and more intuitive understanding of the eﬀects of unemployment insurance.
Relating temporary contracts to unemployment benefits can help us understand why temporary
contacts have failed to boost employment as well as to understand the current resistance to remove
them by allowing us to review the political economy of employment protection.
In short, temporary contracts can increase unemployment, albeit the unemployed are happier
and the employed with permanent contracts are also happier than without temporary contracts.
However, society is worse oﬀ as less output is being produced, and many workers are receiving
minimum wages in a temporary contract, earning less than what they would earn if temporary
contracts were not allowed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model in a context
where only permanent contracts are available. In section 3 both permanent and temporary contracts
are available. Then equilibrium employment in the two systems are compared in section 4. In
section 5, some evidence is provided for the main empirical implications of the model. Section 6
concludes.
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2 One-tier system: only permanent contracts legal
The model is a modified version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) with two
additions: firing costs and a minimum wage. Also, there are two types of contracts: temporary
contracts and permanent contracts, which diﬀer in length and firing costs. We first analyze an
economy in which only permanent contracts are legal (the one-tier system) and then we analyze an
economy in which both permanent and temporary contracts are legal (the two-tier system). The
general assumptions of the model are as follows:
1. We focus on the incentives eﬀects (good and bad) of temporary contracts and the consequences
for labor market outcomes. For ease of exposition, we assume that there are no search frictions.
Instead, there exists queuing.
2. The model is set in continuous time.
3. The number of vacancies in the economy is endogenous. To create a position has a fixed cost
C. The rate at which workers are hired is a. In equilibrium, there are never more vacancies
than unemployed workers. Thus, vacancies are filled and the unemployed may take time in
finding a job. The number of unemployed who find a job per unit of time equals the number of
firms posting vacancies (and instantaneously filling them) per unit of time. This will generate
a non-arbitrage condition determining the number of positions filled in the economy, as the
value of a position must be equal to the creation cost C.
4. All workers are identical and have a constant productivity ey.8
5. Workers are risk neutral and their instantaneous utility function is: U(w˜c, e) = w˜c− e, where
w˜c is the wage in contract c (either a permanent or a temporary, i.e. c = {P, T}) and e is the
cost of providing an eﬀort level e. Worker’s eﬀort is not perfectly observable. The required
eﬀort to perform the job is e, which is the same in any contract. If workers shirk, they expend
zero eﬀort and production is zero.
6. There is a minimum wage, w˜min, that all contracts must satisfy. We do not take this to be
literally the legal minimum wage. It could be the minimum wage that needs to be paid due
to social, exogenous and not-in-the-model conventions. For instance, it could be simply that
it is not feasible to charge a negative wage, as we will see that with temporary contracts the
market might desire to do so.
7. To simplify, we assume that unemployment benefits are zero.
8We do not consider the possible use of temporary contracts to observe workers’ characteristics. Since in most
countries contracts can include a “probation” period with no firing costs, we implicitly assume that this period has
already elapsed and has been useful for this matter. In Spain, a worker can be in the same firm under a temporary
contract for a maximum of three years. Most renewals of temporary into permanent contracts occur at this legal
limit which suggests that mostly firms are using temporary contracts because they provide a cheaper option than
permanent contracts rather than for screening purposes (see Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).
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The goal of this section is to study the situation in which it is only legal to hire workers under
a permanent contract.
2.1 Environment description
In the one-tier system, the only possible contract is a permanent one (ψP ), which is defined by
its wage: ψP = w˜P . Contract structure becomes more complicated when we allow for temporary
contracts.
There are two reasons for the termination of the relationship between workers and firms. First,
workers face a rate b of being separated from their job because the match becomes exogenously
unproductive. Second, there is an imperfect detection technology that catches shirking workers
with some exogenous rate q. Workers found shirking are dismissed. We assume that employment
protection legislation requires firms to compensate workers with a payment F whenever fired.9
This implies that firing costs reduce the cost of shirking which translates into firing costs having a
negative eﬀect on unemployment in the world with only permanent contracts. This will make the
problem of introducing some firing-cost free contracts interesting.
2.2 Wage restrictions in permanent contracts
In a permanent contract, the wage w˜P that the firm pays to the worker has two restrictions:
1. Minimum Wage: w˜P ≥ w˜min
2. Incentive constraint: in order to induce the worker to exert the eﬀort, the firm needs to
pay an eﬃciency wage. We analyze this in the next subsection.
2.2.1 Incentive constraint for permanent contracts
The present discounted values of shirking and not shirking for a permanent worker are as in a
standard eﬃciency wage model, except that here workers always receive F whenever fired. Let V nP
be the present discounted value of not shirking for a permanent worker. And let VU be the present
discounted value of being unemployed, which firms take as given. The following definitions would
be useful for the rest of the paper.
Definition 1. Let ∆ be the smallest diﬀerence between the value of working and of being unemployed
that induces a permanent worker not to shirk: ∆ ≡
³
e
q + F
´
Definition 2. Let wP be the wage net of the eﬀort cost and the present discounted value of the
firing cost (that sooner or later will revert to the worker): wP = w˜P − e+ bF
Definition 3. Let the minimum wage net of the eﬀort cost be: wmin = w˜min − e
9See Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003) for a model and some evidence of dismissals due to workers shirking not
being costless.
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Definition 4. Let wˆP (VU ) be the lowest wage (net of eﬀort and the present discounted value of
firing cost) that induces the worker in a permanent contract not to shirk:
wˆP (VU ) = (r + b)∆+ rVU (1)
Remark 1. The non-shirking condition for permanent workers (NSCP) can be written as:
(V nP − VU ) ≥
µ
e
q
+ F
¶
= ∆ ⇐⇒ wP ≥ wˆP (VU ) = (r + b)∆+ rVU (NSCP)
For a detailed derivation, see appendix (7.1).
This is as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), except for the part related to firing costs. Since
workers that are caught shirking are fired and compensated with F , eﬀectively, this is like if firms
had a worse monitoring technology. Thus, the opportunity cost of shirking is reduced exactly by
F . And the rent to be paid in order to provide incentives, ∆, is augmented by F with respect to
the standard eﬃciency wage model.
2.3 Value of the firm and worker in the one-tier system
2.3.1 Value of the firm
Let JP be the value in steady state of having a position filled by a permanent worker. Realizing
that there is production only if wP ≥ wˆP (VU ), this is given by:
rJP = y˜ − w˜P + b (JP − F − JP )
Definition 5. In order to simplify notation we define the output net of the eﬀort cost: y = y˜ − e
Remark 2. In the one-tier system, the wage of a permanent contract is:
wP = max{wmin + bF, wˆP (VU)} (2)
And the value of the firm depends on whether it is paying the eﬃciency wage or the minimum
wage. This is:
rJP = y −max {wmin + bF − bwP (VU ), 0}− bwP (VU) (3)
For a detailed derivation, see appendix (7.2).
From equation (3), notice that if the minimum wage is not binding (i.e., wmin+ bF ≤ bwP (VU )),
then the value of the firm is decreasing with VU (as it increases the eﬃciency wage). Instead, if
the minimum wage is binding, then the value of the firm does not decrease with VU, but it does
decrease with wmin.
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2.3.2 Value of being unemployed
Unemployed workers find a job at a rate a and get no income while unemployed. By definition, the
value of being unemployed is given by rVU = a (VP − VU ).
Remark 3. In the one-tier system, the value of being unemployed in equilibrium depends on whether
the minimum wage is binding or not and is given by:
rVU = a
½
∆+
max {wmin + bF − bwP (VU ), 0}
r + b
¾
(4)
For a detailed derivation, see appendix (7.3).
If the minimum wage is not binding, given a, the value of being unemployed depends on the rent
paid to permanent workers in order to avoid shirking (that is, (VP − VU) = ∆). If the minimum
wage is binding, given a, the value of being unemployed is increasing in the minimum wage. Let
a1 and VU1 be the equilibrium job finding rate and the value of being unemployed respectively.
2.4 Labor unemployment dynamics
All employment in the one-tier system is permanent, denoted by L. Let U1 be the level of unem-
ployment in the one-tier system, where U1 = (1− L). The steady state level of unemployment is
determined from the following equations: U˙1 = bL− a1 (1− L) and L˙ = a1 (1− L)− bL. The mea-
sure of unemployment that we will use is the employment to unemployment ratio, that in steady
state is given by:
E1 =
L
U1
=
a1
b
(5)
2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the hiring rate a has to be such that: (1) The wage is given by equation (2), (2)
the value of unemployment is determined by equation (4), and finally (3) the value of the firm,
determined by equation (3), has to be equal to the creation cost C.We characterize the equilibrium
in the following result:
Result 1. In the one-tier system: the minimum wage is never binding; if the minimum wage wmin
is larger than y − rC − bF , there is no production. If the minimum wage wmin is smaller than
y − rC − bF , and productivity y is larger than rC + (r + b)∆, then employment is decreasing with
the firing cost F . Formally:
• If wmin < y − rC − bF , then U1 = 1; E1 = 0. -
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• If wmin ≥ y − rC − bF , then:
wP = y − rC;
a1 =
{y − rC − (r + b)∆}
∆
U1 =
b∆
{y − rC − (r + b)∆}+ b∆ ; E1 =
{y − rC − (r + b)∆}
b∆
rVU1 = y − rC − (r + b)∆
Proof. See appendix (7.4).
In order to have production, worker productivity has to be large enough. In particular, it has to
be larger than the minimum wage. Remarkably, when the minimum wage would be binding, it would
be so large that there would be no production, thus it is never binding. Moreover, productivity has
to be large enough to make up of the summation of the unhappiness of working, the annuity of the
cost of the capital and the incentive cost (i.e., (r + b)∆). Thus, our first parametric assumption is
as follows.
Assumption 1. In order to ensure that production takes place in the one-tier system, productivity
net of the creation cost has to be large enough compared both to the minimum wage (i.e., wmin+bF <
y − rC) and to the eﬃciency cost generated by the incentive problem (i.e., (r + b)∆ < y − rC).
That is:
max {wmin + bF, (r + b)∆} ≤ y − rC
Firing costs have a real eﬀect because they reduce the cost of shirking (see the NSCP). They
increase the incentive rent, ∆, and thus reduce the hiring rate a. Firing costs imply higher wages
and thus lower equilibrium employment. Unlike Lazear (1990), this eﬀect cannot be undone through
a deposit scheme because workers would shirk at lower wages. Notice that a reduction of the firing
cost F would reduce unemployment. So, in this context, the introduction of temporary contracts
without firing costs is meaningful and, at a first sight, this policy may seem as one that could lead
to a reduction of unemployment. This is, at least seems to have been the line of reasoning of the
regulators that introduced these contracts in the mid 1980s. In the next sections we will see that
this line of reasoning is deeply flawed if other policies (minimum wage) are left in place.
3 Two-tier system: permanent and temporary contracts
In this section, we consider a modification of the institutional framework that aims to capture
the introduction of temporary contracts in many European countries during the 1980s: the legal-
ization of a firing-cost-free temporary contract while leaving the other labor market regulations
unchanged.10 In particular, mandated firing costs of permanent contracts and the legal minimum
10We consider that, when a temporary contract expires, indemnities are zero. This is the case in most countries.
Also, as temporary contracts can be made suﬃciently short, it can be realistically assumed that they do not involve
firing costs, because the firm always waits for the end of the contract whenever it wants to adjust employment.
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wage are not modified by the introduction of temporary contracts.
3.1 Environment description
When meeting a worker, firms can now choose to oﬀer a temporary contract (TC, hereafter) or a
permanent contract (PC, hereafter). Permanent contracts oﬀered to unemployed workers would be
exactly as in the one-tier system, but they are never oﬀered in equilibrium. Temporary contracts
are as follows.
• TC expire at an exogenous rate λ. Agents can not bargain upon it, as it is an institutional
restriction. TC do not terminate by any other event. This is, b (the expiry rate of PC) does
not aﬀect λ. Thus TC can not be terminated before their due date.
• Shirking temporary workers are detected with an exogenous probability Q. This can only
happen at the moment in which the temporary contract is terminated. This is, λ is indepen-
dent on whether the worker is shirking or not, but if he is shirking he can be detected once
the date arrives.11
• Formally, the TC bounds the firm and the worker only during the duration of the contract.
Nevertheless, in practice firms and workers are aware that upon expiration of the TC it is
possible to transform it into a PC (as the one in the one-tier system).12 A worker can only be
hired once by the same firm under a TC. When this expires, the firm has to decide whether
to renew the worker into a PC or to fire him. This happens with endogenous probability
R.13 As in standard eﬃciency wage models, we assume that firms commit to a future wage.
Moreover, we also assume that firms commit to future renewal rates of temporary contracts
into permanent ones. In subsection (3.7), we show that this is an innocuous assumption.
• Thus temporary contracts may have two phases: a temporary one, and a permanent one, and
are characterized by the triplet
ψT = { ewT , R, ewP}
where ewT and ewP are the wages during the temporary and permanent phase of such contract.
The incentive-compatible contract for the permanent phase (PC) is characterized exactly as
in the one-tier system. To analyze firm’s choice of contracts, we first need to characterize an
incentive-compatible for the temporary phase. We do this in the next subsection.
11Notice that given the all shocks are Poisson, the individual either shirks all the time or never.
12The expected duration of the permanent contract is the same independently of if there was a temporary part or
not. It is determined solely by b.
13Assuming that TC can be renewed into further TC would not alter the results because, as will be shown, it is
necessary that at some point TC get renewed into PC.
10
3.2 Wage restrictions in temporary contracts
Definition 6. It is convenient to define the wage of the temporary phase net of eﬀort levels as:
wT = w˜T − e
In a temporary contract, there are three restrictions to be taken into account:
1. Minimum wage: wages in any of the phases of the TC must be at least the minimum wage:"
w˜min ≤ w˜T
w˜min ≤ w˜P
#
⇐⇒
"
wmin ≤ wT
wmin + bF ≤ wP
#
Also, in each phase of the contract must be incentive compatible:
2. Incentive constraint for the permanent-phase. In order to induce the worker to exercise
eﬀort while in the permanent-phase of the contract, the firm needs to pay an eﬃciency wage.
This is exactly as in the one-tier system. Thus the NSCP must be satisfied.
3. Incentive constraint for the temporary-phase. In order to induce the worker to exercise
eﬀort while in the temporary-phase of the contract, the firm needs to promise a large enough
renewal rate. We analyze this in the next subsection.
3.2.1 Incentive constraint for the temporary-phase
Provided that the NSCP is satisfied in the permanent-phase of the contract, the values for the
worker of shirking and not shirking during the temporary phase are respectively:
rV sT = w˜T + λ [R (1−Q) (VP − V sT ) + [1−R(1−Q)] (VU − V sT )]
rV nT = w˜T − e+ λ [R (VP − V nT ) + (1−R) (VU − V nT )]
Note that not being caught shirking is a necessary condition to be renewed into a PC, it allows
entering into the renewal lottery.
Result 2. The non-shirking condition for the temporary-phase (NSCT) is independent of the tem-
porary wage wT . The NSCT is that the renewal rate R is large enough. Formally,
(V nT − V sT ) ≥ 0⇐⇒ R (VP − VU ) ≥
e
λQ
(NSCT)
Proof. It follows directly from V sT and V
n
T .
The intuition for this result is simple: no action of the worker determines the length of time she
is going to receive the temporary wage, so the stream of income from the temporary-phase of the
contract is essentially lump sum. Thus, the temporary wage does not provide incentives. Incentives
in the temporary-phase are provided by the expected future gains of becoming a permanent worker
(and getting the eﬃciency wage). So, firms need to commit to a suﬃciently high renewal rate into
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Figure 1: Incentive restrictions in a temporary contract.
a permanent contract. If workers always become unemployed at the end of the temporary-phase
(independently of the eﬀort exerted), then there would be no way to motivate them. This is not
unrealistic.
3.2.2 Wage in the temporary-phase
The wage in the temporary-phase of the contract has no incentive role. Thus it will be set equal to
the maximum of: (i) the minimum wage and (ii) the wage that satisfies the participation constraint:
wT : VT ≥ VU . As we will see in section (3.6), for low levels of the minimum wage, the temporary
wage will determined by the (binding) participation constraint and for high levels of the minimum
wage, the temporary wage will be equal to the legal minimum wage.
3.2.3 All incentive restrictions together
A temporary contract must satisfy both the NSCT and the NSCP, represented in figure (1). We
can check graphically when do both conditions hold.
Assumption 2. Clearly in order to ensure that the NSCT and the NSCP conditions can simulta-
neously hold with a renewal probability in the interval [0, 1], we need to assume:
e
λQ
<
e
q
+ F
A high enough firing cost ensures that this assumption holds.
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Definition 7. Let ρ be the renewal probability if both incentive restrictions bind:
ρ =
e/λQ
e/q + F
∈ (0, 1)
Definition 8. It is useful to make the following definition:
γ =
r
r + λρ
∈ (0, 1)
The larger that γ is, the smaller that the renewal rate is relative to the discount rate.
3.3 Choice of contracts
It follows from result (2) that temporary wages have no incentive role and thus will not be not
larger than permanent wages:
w˜T ≤ w˜P (VU ) (6)
So, it is straightforward that, given VU (and, thus, given permanent wages), in the two-tier system,
firms cannot be worse oﬀ by oﬀering contract ψT instead of contract ψP . Thus:
Result 3. In the two-tier system, given VU (and, thus, given ewP ), firms always prefer to oﬀer
workers a temporary contact (i.e., ψT = { ewT , R, ewP }) than a permanent one (i.e., ψP = { ewP}).
Proof. It follows directly from condition (6) and the fact that at the end of the temporary-phase of
contract ψT , no firing costs are involved.
The temporary contract ψT is incentive compatible for all workers: workers in the temporary-
phase are motivated by the possibility of becoming permanent (since permanent wages are not
lower than temporary wages); and workers in the permanent-phase are motivated to keep their
jobs in order to avoid (i) becoming unemployed (as in standard eﬃciency wage models) as well as,
in our model, (ii) restarting with a temporary contract (as the only way to exit unemployment is
through a temporary contract).
3.4 Value of the firm and worker in the two-tier system
3.4.1 Value of the firm
Firms oﬀer a temporary contract ψT and therefore a position in the firm may be in one of the
following two circumstances: filled by a temporary worker (i.e., workers being in the temporary-
phase of the contract); filled by a permanent worker (i.e., workers that have been renewed and are
in the permanent-phase of the contract). Let the value functions of each circumstance be JT and
JP , respectively.
• The value of having a permanent worker is analogous to the one-tier system. If wP ≥ wˆP (VU )
(there is production):
rJP = ey − ewP + b (JP − F − JP ) (7)
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• Given that the NSCP holds, there is production only if λRQ (VP − VU ) ≥ e, then the value
of having a temporary worker is:
rJT = y − wT + λ [R (JP − JT ) + (1−R) (JT − JT )] (8)
In what follows, we assume that both incentive constraints are binding and later we show that
in equilibrium that is the case (see appendix (7.7)).
Remark 4. Assuming that both the NSCP and the NSCT are binding, the value of the firm is
given by
rJT = y − [γ wT + (1− γ) wˆP (VU )] (9)
This remark follows from the value functions of firms (7) and (8).
Like in the one-tier system, if the minimum wage is not binding, the value of the firm is
decreasing with VU (as it increases the eﬃciency wage paid in the permanent-phase of the contract
and it may increase the temporary wage). If the minimum wage is binding, then the value of the
firm decreases with wmin.
3.4.2 Value of being unemployed
The diﬀerence in value of being unemployed in the two systems is going to play a key role in our
results. Let a2 be the job finding rate and VU2 be the value of being unemployed in equilibrium in
the two-tier system. All transitions from unemployment to employment are through a temporary
contract ψT . Thus, the value of being unemployed is given by rVU2 = a2 (VT − VU2).
Remark 5. In the two-tier system, if both NSCP and NSCT are binding, the value of being un-
employed is:
rVU2
r + λ+ a2
a2
= wT + λρ∆ (10)
For a detailed derivation see appendix (7.5).
Equation (10) states the value of being unemployed as a function of the contract ψT . If the
minimum wage is binding, given a2, the value of being unemployed is increasing in the minimum
wage.
3.5 Labor unemployment dynamics
In the two-tier system, all firms oﬀer the temporary contract ψT and thus there is temporary
employment (denoted by LT ) as well as permanent employment (denoted by LP ). Let U2 be the
level of unemployment in the two-tier system, where U2 = (1 − LT − LP ). The dynamics of the
labor market are determined from the following equations:
U˙2 = bLP + λ (1−R)LT − a2 (1− LP − LT )
L˙P = λRLT − bLP ; L˙T = a2 (1− LP − LT )− λLT
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In steady state, LT = a2(a2b λR+a2+λ)
and LP =
a2
b λR
(a2b λR+a2+λ)
, thus, the employment to unemploy-
ment ratio is given by:
E2 =
1− U2
U2
=
a2
b
(b+ λR)
λ
(11)
Comparing equations (5) and (11), shows how diﬀerent the labor market dynamics are once
temporary contracts have been introduced.
3.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, assuming that the NSCT and NSCP are binding (later we show that in equilibrium
this is the case), the hiring rate a2 has to be such that:
(1) The temporary wage is given by the maximum of: (i) wmin and (ii) wT : VT ≥ VU2.
(2) The permanent wage is the eﬃciency wage wˆP (VU ).
(3) The value of the unemployed is determined by equation (10).
(4) The value of the firm, determined by equation (9), has to be equal to the creation cost C.
Remark 6. In any equilibrium where NSCP and NSCT are binding the following expression must
hold:
r(JT − C) = y − rC −
(r + λ) γ + a2
r + λ+ a2
(wT + λρ∆)− (1− γ)b∆ (12)
This remark follows directly from equations (9) and (10).
Expression (12) characterizes the equilibrium in the two-tier system. As in the one-tier system,
in equilibrium the value of the firm (which equals C) is determined by the value of unemployment;
while the value of unemployment is determined by the contract oﬀered to workers and a2.
The equilibrium depends critically on the value of the minimum wage, as it determines the
temporary wage wT . In what follows, we do comparative statics exercises (only in steady states)
considering diﬀerent minimum wage levels. A case with a “low” minimum wage case and a case
with “high” minimum wage will become relevant.
3.6.1 Low minimum wage. No unemployment
Result 4. If wmin ≤ y − rC − λρ∆ − (1 − γ)b∆, then: the minimum wage does not bind neither
in the temporary-phase nor in the permanent-phase; there is no unemployment. Both NSCP and
NSCT bind and in equilibrium we have:
ψT = {wT , R,wP } = {y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)b∆, ρ, y − rC +∆(r + γb)}
a2 →∞;U2 = 0; E2 →∞
rVU2 = rVT = y − rC − (1− γ)b∆, rVP = y − rC − (1− γ)b∆+ r∆
JT = C; JP = C −
∆(r + γb)
r
;
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Proof. For wmin = y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)∆b, the equilibrium condition (12) can only hold with
a2 →∞, thus establishing the inexistence of unemployed workers.
For wmin < y− rC−λρ∆− (1−γ)∆b, the equilibrim condition (12) is incompatible with a2 ≥ 0
unless the wage is bid up to wmin = y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)∆b. The minimum wage is so low that
it is very attractive to create a firm. For given wmin, it is so attractive that too many firms would
be created and they would have to queue for workers. But firms would bid up temporary wages up
to the point that there would be no more unemployed in order to avoid queing (and having unsued
capital). Thus, ∀wmin such that wmin ≤ y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)∆b, full employment is reached.
We prove that NSCT and NSCP bind in appendix (7.7).
Unlike one-tier systems and standard eﬃciency wage models, here full employment is compatible
with incentives. The first best is achieved. The contract structure solves the incentive problem.
Notice that this happens for a very low minimum wage given workers’ productivity, perhaps even
negative. There are no unemployed workers, but having a temporary job is bad enough. Workers
in the temporary-phase are willing to pay to get a job and later obtain higher payments. This has
the positive side eﬀect of solving the incentive problems without the need of unemployment: to
loose your job is very bad because even if you find a job immediately after being fired, you can
only restart with a very low-paid temporary job. Workers in the permanent-phase are motivated to
avoid being fired and having to re-start their career (in some other firm) with a temporary contract
(perhaps paying again a fee).
In our model (and diﬀerently than other models with bonding, like Akerlof and Katz (1989)) the
implicit bonding that temporary wages represent is a perfect substitute for a first-best contract.
The reason lies that in our model temporary wages have no incentive role. If the minimum wage is
low, they are determined by the participation constraint. Unemployment becomes "unnecessary",
as it loses all incentive role.
3.6.2 High minimum wage. Unemployment.
Result 5. If y − rC − λρ∆ − (1 − γ)b∆ ≤ wmin ≤ y − rC − bF then: the minimum wage binds
in the temporary-phase, but not in the permanent-phase; there is unemployment. Unemployment is
increasing in the minimum wage. Both NSCP and NSCT bind and in equilibrium we have:
ψT = {wT , R,wP } =
½
wmin, ρ,
(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆) + (1− γ)r∆
1− γ
¾
a2 = (r + λ)
(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)− (1− γ)b∆
(wmin + λρ∆)− (y − rC) + (1− γ)b∆
;
U2 =
λb[(wmin+λρ∆)−(y−rC)+(1−γ)b∆]
λb[(wmin+λρ∆)−(y−rC)+(1−γ)b∆]+(b+λρ)(r+λ)[(y−rC)−γ(wmin+λρ∆)−(1−γ)b∆] ;
E2 =
(b+ λρ)
λ
(r + λ)
b
(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)− (1− γ)b∆
(wmin + λρ∆)− (y − rC) + (1− γ)b∆
;
rVU =
(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)− (1− γ)b∆
1− γ ;
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rVT =
λ (y − rC)− [(λ+ r)γ − r] (wmin + λρ∆)− λ(1− γ)b∆
(1− γ)(λ+ r) ;
rVP =
(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)
1− γ ;
JT = C; JP = C −
(y − rC − wmin)
λρ
Proof. Given the large enough level of the minimum wage considered, the only way of making
equilibrium condition (12) hold is by making workers queue for firms, while firms find them instan-
tanously. Every thing else follows. We prove that NSCT and NSCP bind in appendix (7.7).
The eﬃciency wage of the permanent-phase is decreasing in the minimum wage but always larger
than the minimum wage (in all this range). Notice that the largest possible value of the minimum
wage allowed by assumption (1) is y − rC − bF, in which case w˜P − w˜min > 0.
Assumption 3. The largest possible value of the minimum wage allowed by assumption (1) is
y−rC−bF. In order to ensure that there exist values of the minimum wage such that (i) production
takes place in the one-tier system and (ii) there is unemployment in the two-tier system, we need
to make the following assumption:
∆(1− γ)[r + λρ+ b]− bF > 0
The larger the minimum wage is, the less interesting is to create firms, ceteris paribus, as less
profits can be extracted in the temporary-phase. Thus, there is less firm creation. From the workers
point of view, the higher minimum wage the less bad is holding a TC. Therefore, unlike when the
minimum wage is low, temporary contracts do not solve the incentive problem. Unemployment is
necessary. Unemployment eases the incentive problem by lowering the prospects of (hypothetical)
shirking workers who hold a permanent contract, who have to wait to get a job, like in all eﬃciency
wages models of the Shapiro-Stiglitz tradition. Unemployment becomes the threat that solves the
incentive problem of the firm.
Remark 7. If y−rC−λρ∆−(1−γ)b∆ ≤ wmin ≤ y−rC−bF, the value of all agents is decreasing
in wmin.
The larger the minimum wage, the larger the unemployment is, and the lower the value of
all workers is. Unemployed workers are worse oﬀ as they have more waiting time to get a job.
Permanent workers are worse oﬀ as their value has a fixed wedge with the value of being unemployed.
Even workers in the temporary-phase (and earning the minimum wage) are worse oﬀ. This is
because the necessary increase in unemployment (to overcome the more stringent incentive problem)
worsens the value in the temporary-phase, by implying more time spent on unemployment over the
lifetime of the individual which does not compensate the higher pay while employed. Recall that
the probability of accessing the permanent contract is constant and independent of the minimum
wage (see NSCT).
Notice how much the equilibrium outcome depends on the value of the minimum wage.
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If the minimum wage is “low”, holding a temporary contract is very bad. This is so costly for
workers that solves all the incentive problems and unemployment disappears. The temporary wage
could be negative, in which case workers would be “paying” their way into employment by paying
a fee during the temporary-phase of the contract. Firms are able to pay relatively low eﬃciency
wage to workers in the permanent-phase and the first best is reached.
If the minimum wage is “high”, workers in the temporary-phase of the contract are having fun,
as their wages are “large”. Being a temporary worker would not seem such a bad thing anymore
and thus the prospects of becoming one are not bad enough to be a significant threat that forces
permanent workers to provide eﬀort. The eﬃciency wage paid to permanent workers needs to be
larger for any given level of unemployment. Larger wages induce lower value to the firms, and thus
demand unemployment in order to decrease the outside option of permanent workers, and allow
the value of a firm with a temporary worker to equal the creation cost C. Notice that firms do
not hire workers directly into a permanent contract because the minimum wage, albeit being too
high to be a perfect threat, is still lower than the eﬃciency wage, and can be oﬀered only in the
temporary phase.
Thus, minimum wages larger than y − rC − λρ∆ − (1 − γ)b∆ induce unemployment in the
two-tier system. And the larger the minimum wage, the larger the unemployment level. Not only
that, the large minimum wage destroys the ability of temporary contracts to solve the incentive
problem. Consequently, all workers lose from increases in the minimum wage.
3.7 Commitment
There are two commitment related issues. First, irrespectively of the minimum wage, the value
of a firm with a permanent worker is lower than C. It could be thought that this would induce
firms to close at this stage. Notice, nevertheless that the value of the firm with a permanent
worker is positive if C is large enough. Thus, for C large enough firms have no incentive to declare
bankruptcy once workers access the permanent phase. And this irrespectively of whether there is
limited liability (in which case the threshold value to declare bankruptcy would be 0) or not (in
which case it would be −F ). Thus, C can prevent firms of having the incentive to break up when
workers are in the permanent-phase.
A second issue is that firms have incentives to breach the contract ψT at the time of expiration
of the temporary phase. The firm’s value of a permanent worker is always lower than the one
of a temporary one. Thus, we have to consider the possibility that the firm may not renew the
temporary-phase of the contract into the permanent-phase, or to do so with a probability lower
than ρ. If there were no fixed costs for firm creation this time inconsistency problem would be a
serious concern, but a fixed creation cost C solves it insofar the lottery is publicly observable:
Result 6. If the renewal probability of temporary contracts is publicly observable (i.e., if the prob-
abilities in the lottery can be monitored) and the creation cost C is not smaller than ∆(r+γb)r , there
exists an equilibrium in the repeated game with memory in which the firms do oﬀer and enforce the
contract ψT .
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Proof. The value of a firm with a permanent worker is larger than zero whenever C > ∆(r+γb)r .
Consider a strategy in which workers of a firm that in the past has renewed a contract with a
probability lower than ρ would never exert eﬀort anymore. This would bring firm’s value to zero.
It is then clear that insofar workers can commit to such a strategy, there exists an equilibrium with
firms oﬀering and not breaching contract ψT .
The equilibrium is not renegotiation proof, thus it demands (like any other non-Markov equi-
librium in any repeated game) of commitment to the strategy on the part of the workers, which we
simply assume. In this context, this is not completely unreasonable, as no firm oﬀers a permanent
contract directly and it is quite easy to get a temporary contract (the hiring rate is higher than
without temporary contracts).
We also assume here that the lottery is observable: the true probabilities are observed like in
a National Lottery or in a Casino. This simplifies the algebra, but it is not necessary to obtain
the result. We could as well assume that firms were “large” and had a minimum size involving a
positive mass of workers, so that in each period it could be observed the fraction of agents that
the firm is renewing, and thus observing if it is complying with the contract. Alternatively we
could assume that agents observed the past behavior of the firm, and judge if the historic renewal
rate deviates from ρ (learning of firms that breach the contract). Either alternative would involve
substantially longer algebra without adding new insights.
4 Comparative statics of the introduction of temporary contracts
The point of this paper is to compare the level of steady state unemployment in an universe where
temporary contracts are allowed with another universe where they are not, for a given minimum
wage. We have seen that if the minimum wage is low, or does not exist, the unemployment level
is lower in the universe with temporary contracts, as they ease the incentive constraints of the
economy. On the other hand, we have also seen that the larger the minimum wage, the larger the
unemployment is in the universe with temporary contracts. It remains to be seen if for relatively
high levels of the minimum wage the steady state unemployment level is larger in the universe with
temporary contracts. The following result shows that this is indeed the case:
Result 7. ∃w∗ : y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)b∆ < w∗ < y − rC − bF and, ∀wmin > w∗ =⇒ U2 > U1
for at least some positive values of b.
Under this condition, if the minimum wage is large enough the steady state unemployment level
is larger if temporary contracts are allowed than if they are not.
Proof. See appendix (7.6).
Therefore, the introduction of temporary contracts can imply worse employment outcomes if
the minimum wage is high enough. In particular, b being suﬃciently low (the permanent contract
being permanent enough) is a suﬃcient condition to insure that there exist a certain wage threshold,
such that if mandatory minimum wage is above it, unemployment is higher in the universe where
temporary contracts are available.
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This result may seem surprising, as in the universe without temporary contracts a reduction of
firing costs would necessarily reduce unemployment. Indeed, this was precisely the reasoning that
induced many countries to create or extend the legal figure of temporary contracts. Our point is
that this reasoning is incorrect. Moreover, it is incorrect even if it is right that when the minimum
wage is low (or negative, or it does not exist) temporary contracts do reduce unemployment levels.
Interestingly, the reason why it is incorrect is precisely because temporary contracts increase the
flows to and from unemployment.
Temporary contracts are destroyed often, and consequently, are created often. This implies that
unemployed workers expect to get a temporary job in a relatively short time if TC are allowed.
Furthermore, the probability that the contract is renewed into a permanent one is independent
of the minimum wage, as it is used an the incentive device during the temporary phase. This
means that if the minimum wage is high, an unemployed worker knows that with a relatively high
probability she is going to access soon a relatively highly paid job. Thus, to be unemployed is not
so bad. This has a negative eﬀect on the structure of incentives, as it increases the eﬃciency wage,
and reduces the willingness of firms to create jobs.
This can be seen in the following remark which follows after some algebra from comparing
results 1 and 5:
Remark 8. For any given wmin, the value of an unemployed worker in the universe with temporary
contracts is always larger than in the universe without them.
If the minimum wage is low, the results of the introduction of temporary contracts are not unlike
an increase of the provision of unemployment insurance: by increasing the value of the unemployed
it complicates the structure of incentives of the economy. Higher unemployment appears as an
incentive device.
In order to see the intuition for this result, imagine that the unemployment level were the same
in both systems (with and without TC). Total unemployment being the same, GDP and average
consumption would also be the same in both worlds, as firms’ value at creation is zero. Nevertheless
unemployed workers would value both worlds very diﬀerently. In the universe where temporary
contracts are forbidden, the unemployed need to wait for a long time in order to get some income.
In the universe with temporary contracts the timing of their income flows is very diﬀerent, albeit
their average income would be the same. In the two-tier system (even if as in the one-tier system it
also takes time to get a PC),14 the unemployed have rapid access to income thanks to faster arrival
of temporary contracts. A high minimum wage means that a large share of total income goes to
(temporary) workers faster than in the one-tier system. Given discounting, this necessarily makes
the unemployed happier in the two-tier system than in the one-tier system. Given our assumption
of constant unemployment, the unemployed have the same level of consumption over their lifetime,
but they consume much sooner. This diﬀerence in the timing of income flows, plus discounting, is
what makes TC to have similar eﬀects than unemployment insurance.
14Recall that the renewal rate is fixed by the NSCT.
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The bad news is that this worsens the incentive problem faced by the firms, which need to pay
larger eﬃciency wages for any given unemployment level. That is, permanent workers are more
expensive in the two-tier system than in the one-tier system. Recall that the only diﬀerence in the
equilibrium wages of permanent workers in the two systems comes from the potential diﬀerences in
the values of being unemployed, see equation (1). So, in the two-tier system with a high minimum
wage, the eﬃciency wages of permanent contracts that are compatible with any given level of un-
employment are larger than in the one-tier system, which implies lower job creation and potentially
(for minimum wages high enough) lower employment than in the one-tier system.
5 Empirical implications
We provide evidence that gives support to the main empirical implications of the model.
(1) A central implication of the model is that when the minimum wage is too high, then the
introduction of TCs increases unemployment. This implies that, for a given level of the minimum
wage in the economy, the distortion will be higher for low skilled workers than for high skilled ones.
In order to test this implication, we focus on the Spanish labor market, which is an ideal testing
ground (see, for instance, Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno, 2002). In the mid-80s, Spain had
an unemployment rate of around 20% of the labor force, the highest among OECD countries. It
also ranked second in terms of strictest employment protection legislation (OECD, 1999). This
situation triggered the introduction of TCs in 1984. Spain is an extreme case in terms of the
incidence of TCs: soon after their introduction, more than 90% of newly created contracts were
TCs, and this translated into a rapidly growing stock of temporary employment: from 11% in 1983
to approximately 35% by the early 1990s, which is more than three times the European average
(see OECD, 1993). The 1984 reform constitutes the main labor market reform in Spain in the
1980s.15
The empirical strategy we follow to test this prediction is to analyze the evolution of the
diﬀerence in unemployment rates by skill groups before and after the introduction of TCs in 1984.
We use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de la Población Activa, EPA), which
is carried out quarterly on a sample of some 60,000 households. This survey is designed to be
representative of the total Spanish population and contains very detailed information about the
labor force status of individuals.
The sample we use includes individuals in the labor force during the 1980s16. We exclude
15Another relevant fact is found in Dolado and Felgueroso (1997). They show that between 1989 and 1995, the
share of workers for whom the minimum wage was binding increased from 9 to 56 percent among workers aged 16-19
and from 2 to 9 percent among workers aged 20 to 24. This fact is consistent with the increase of TCs. The incidence
of TCs among these age groups is particularly high. While there were some changes in the minimum wage legislation
for workers aged 16-17 in 1989, it does not seem that this alone could explain the facts.
16Since there were changes in the minimum wage legislation in 1989, we concentrate on the period 1980-1989 for
our analysis.
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inactive individuals as well as workers above retirement age (65 years old). The dependent variable
takes value one for all the unemployed and zero otherwise. The model includes skill dummies, year
dummies and interaction of skill dummies with a reform dummy (value one for all years after 1983).
Year dummies absorb any evolution in unemployment that is common to the diﬀerent skill groups.
Skill dummies capture diﬀerences in unemployment levels across skill groups. The coeﬃcient on
the skill dummies with the post reform dummies hence captures the diﬀerential change before and
after the reform in unemployment rates between skill groups. Three skill dummies are included:
unskilled1 is a dummy for completed secondary school and no tertiary education; unskilled2 is
a dummy for completed primary school and uncompleted secondary school; and unskilled3 is a
dummy for education less than primary. The omitted category is university education or above.
According to the model, the coeﬃcient on the interaction of skill dummies with the reform dummy
(the diﬀerential eﬀect of the reform with respect to the reference category) should be positive.
Moreover, it should be lower for more skilled workers than for less skilled ones (for instance,
unskilled1 and unskilled3).
One obvious objection to this model is that the treatment variables might capture the eﬀect of
time changes in skill specific unemployment rates that do not depend on the eﬀect of the reform.
If unemployment rates happened to increase more for unskilled workers than for skilled ones before
and after 1984 for reasons other than the introduction of TCs, the estimates are likely to be
biased. A natural candidate for the rise in unemployment rates of unskilled workers is skilled
biased technological change: if the relative demand for skilled workers grew more than the relative
supply, this might explain the results. In order to control for this, we introduce the interaction of
skill dummies with a linear trend (similarly to Katz and Murphy, 1992 and Card and Lemieux,
2001).
Column (1) of Table 1 reports the marginal eﬀects of the probit estimates using yearly data
from 1980 to 1989. Standard errors are clustered by year and skill. The main prediction of the
model is confirmed: for all groups, the 1984 reform implied a higher eﬀect on unemployment for
less skilled than for more skilled workers. Moreover, this eﬀect monotonically decreases with the
skill level. This model includes skill dummies with a linear trend suggesting that skilled biased
technological change is unlikely to explain the results.
Next we perform some robustness checks. First, we estimate the same model allowing for
regional dummies since diﬀerences in unemployment rates by skill groups might diﬀer in diﬀerent
regions. As column (2) shows, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients remains unchanged. Second, we
also allow for several individual characteristics.17 As column (3) shows, the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients is somehow reduced but the main pattern of the coeﬃcients remains unchanged and
consistent with the predictions of the model.
(2) Another important implication of the model is the relationship between the renewal rate of
TCs into PCs and firing costs. The optimal renewal rate of TCs is lower the higher the firing costs
are. In our theoretical model, firing costs F implicitly include severance payments as well as the
17See Table 1 for details.
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eﬀect of dismissal conflicts.18 Table 2 provides evidence of this result for some European countries.
In that table, countries are ordered according to firing cost F and, as can be seen in column (4),
the renewal rate R decreases with F , confirming the prediction of the model.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the eﬀect of the introduction of temporary contracts on unem-
ployment in an eﬃciency wage model. We have provided a novel explanation of why temporary
contracts might increase unemployment based on their eﬀect on incentives. And we do this in a
context where a reduction of firing costs would have reduced unemployment.
Using an eﬃciency wage model, it is natural to incorporate the renewal rate of fixed-term
contracts as a meaningful economic variable. Temporary contracts must be renewed into permanent
contracts with a high enough probability in order to provide incentives. In turn, temporary wages
have no incentive role insofar the contract length is fixed. The renewal rate is lower the higher
the eﬀect of firing costs is. This result is supported by the empirical evidence reported for some
European countries. As in standard eﬃciency wage models, permanent workers are motivated by
the fear of losing their jobs. Additionally, in our model, they are also motivated in order to avoid
restarting with a temporary contract, as all firms only oﬀer temporary contracts to the unemployed.
It is often stated that the argument for introducing fixed-term contracts is that this is “the price
to pay to in order get full employment”. But higher employment at the expense of segmentation
of the labor market only arises if wages of temporary contracts are very flexible. This is why the
minimum wage is a critical part of our story. By "minimum wage" we mean the minimum wage
that can be paid due to social or legal conventions. It could just be that it is not feasible to charge
a fee in exchange of a temporary job.
In the absence of a minimum wage the market restores full employment. The intuition is simple:
being a temporary worker is not such a great deal and thus no unemployment is necessary in order
to induce incentives as temporary contracts take this role. If the minimum wage is high, this is not
true anymore. Being a temporary worker is not as bad, and unemployment is required in order to
provide the right incentives.
For high enough minimum wage, the equilibrium unemployment is higher in the world with
temporary contracts than in the world with only permanent contracts. The reason is that it makes
the provision of incentives more costly in a similar manner as higher unemployment insurance
would do: the unemployed are better oﬀ with high-minimum wage temporary contracts than in the
one-tier system, which unfortunately translates into more expensive permanent contracts in the
two-tier system. Relating the eﬀect of temporary contracts (when the minimum wage is high) to
those of unemployment insurance is a very useful finding. The eﬀects of temporary contracts are
complex yet we have a better understanding of the eﬀects of unemployment benefits. Our findings
18Recall that F is paid to workers whenever fired (including when the worker shirks). By law, shirking workers
can only get compensation if they win the case in court (as by default they get no indemnity).
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might give some hints of why there is currently opposition in some countries on the abolition of
temporary contacts in order to fight high unemployment rates.
The introduction of fixed-term contracts leaving the existing labor market regulations un-
changed (that is, leaving the non—neutral eﬀects of firing costs unchanged) leads to a substitution
of these contracts for permanent ones and it can also imply lower equilibrium employment if the
minimum wage is high enough. This implies that, for a given level of the minimum wage in the
economy, such distortion will be higher for low skilled workers than for high skilled workers. This
result is supported by the empirical evidence provided for Spain, the country with the highest
incidence of temporary contracts in Europe.
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Table 1. The introduction of temporary contracts and
unemployment diﬀerentials by skills, 1980-1989
(1) (2) (3)
unskilled1 X post-reform 0.033 0.032 0.019
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
unskilled2 X post-reform 0.031 0.030 0.026
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
unskilled3 X post-reform 0.073 0.070 0.066
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Skill Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Skill Dummies X Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies No Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No Yes
N. of observations 704,440 704,440 704,440
Notes: (1) Marginal eﬀects of a probit model of unemployment (0,1)
on a measure of the introduction of TCs in Spain. (2) Regional
dummies include 50 provinces. (3) Individual controls include a
dummy for female, a dummy for married, dummies for age groups,
the number of working adults and the number of children in the
household. (4) Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by
year and skill. (5) Source: EPA.
Table 2. Renewal rate of temporary contracts and firing costs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C d F R years
Spain 35 0.72 25.2 0.11 1987-96
Italy 32.5 0.55 17.8 (0.21,0.36)1 1999
France 15 0.74 11.1 0.33 1988-92
UK 8 0.45 3.6 (0.36,0.38)2 1991-97
Notes: C denotes the unfair severance payment; d denotes the probability that
a dismissal is declared unfair in court and F = dC;R denotes the renewal rate.
1The first (second) number refers to renewal after 3 (5) years of a TC.
2The first (second) number refers males (females) in Britain.
Sources: OECD (1999), Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2000), Güell and
Petrongolo (2007), Cipollone and Guelfi (2002), Goux et al. (2001),
and Booth et al. (2002).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Remark 1
Proof.
• The values of shirking and not shirking for a worker with a PC are, respectively:
rV sP = w˜P + (b+ q)(VU + F − V sP )
rV nP = w˜P − e+ b(VU + F − V nP )
• It follows that:
V nP − V sP ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (V nP − VU ) ≥
µ
e
q
+ F
¶
= ∆⇐⇒ w˜P − e+ bF ≥ (r + b)∆+ rVU
7.2 Proof of Remark 2
Proof.
• We first consider the case of paying less than the eﬃciency wage. This is, if for some reason:
wP < bwP (VU ). In this case, there would be no production, and JP would be: rJP =
−(w˜P + bF ) < 0. Obviously in this case firms would not be created.
• Thus, if there is production, the wage is at least bwP (VU ). Given that the value of the firm
decreases with the wage, it is clear that:
wP = max{wmin + bF, bwP (VU )}
• If the minimum wage is not binding, we have: wmin + bF ≤ bwP (VU ) = wP . In this case we
can rewrite JP as follows:
rJP = y − wP = y − (r + b)∆− rVU
• If the minimum wage is binding, we have: bwP (VU ) ≤ wmin + bF = wP . In this case we can
rewrite JP as follows:
rJP = y − wmin − bF
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7.3 Proof of Remark 3
Proof.
• If the minimum wage is not binding, given that VP − VU = ∆, it follows that rVU = a∆.
• If the minimum wage is binding, the value of being employed is given by (r+ b)(VP − VU ) =
wmin + bF − rVU and therefore it follows that rVU = a(r+b+a) (wmin + bF ).
7.4 Proof of Result 1
Proof.
• If the minimum wage is not binding: wmin + bF ≤ bwP (VU ) = (r + b)∆ + rVU . Putting
together equations (3) and (4), we have that: r (JP − C) = (y − rC)− (r + b)∆− a∆. The
value of the firm needs to equal its creation cost: JP = C. Thus, a has to be such that:
0 = {y − rC − (r + b)∆}− a∆.
Notice that:
— If {y − rC − (r + b)∆} < 0 there is no non-negative a that can allow for JP = C. The
productivity is so low that it is not worth producing.
— If {y − rC − (r + b)∆} ≥ 0 then:
a1 =
{y − rC − (r + b)∆}
∆
rVU1 = y − rC − (r + b)∆
rVP = y − rC − b∆
wP = wˆP (VU ) = y − rC
JP = C
Thus, the eﬃciency wage is fixed at wP = wˆP (VU ) = y− rC. So, it can not be the case
that y − rC < wmin + bF = w˜min + bF < wˆP (VU ): if the minimum wage is very large,
there is no production.
• If the minimum wage were binding: bwP (VU ) = (r + b)∆+rVU ≤ wmin+bF . Putting together
equations (3) and (4), we have that: r (JP − C) = (y − rC)−{wmin + bF}. The only solution
for which JP = C is when wmin+bF = y−rC. But given the above, in this case the minimum
wage would stop being binding. Thus the minimum wage is never binding.
30
7.5 Proof of Remark 5
Proof.
• If the NSCP holds, the value of holding a PC is: (r + b)(VP − VU ) = wP − rVU .
• If the NSCT holds, the value of holding a TC is: (r+λ)(VT −VU ) = wT +λR(VP −VU )−rVU .
• Given that rVU2 = a2 (VT − VU ), it follows directly from the value functions of a worker of
holding a PC and a TC.
7.6 Proof of Result 7
Proof. We consider only values of wmin where there can be production in the world without
temporary contracts and unemployment in the world with them:
y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)b∆ ≤ wmin ≤ y − rC − bF
Given the employment rates in the world with and without temporary contracts (see results 1
and 5), the ratio of the employment rate in both:
Ξ =
E1
E2
==
λ
(b+ λρ)
{y − rC − (r + b)∆}
(r + λ)∆
{(wmin + λρ∆)− (y − rC) + (1− γ)b∆}
{(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)− (1− γ)b∆)}
Unemployment is larger in the world with temporary contracts iﬀ Ξ > 1. Notice that Ξ is
increasing in the minimum wage (and is zero in its lowest possible value wmin + λρ∆ = y − rC −
(1− γ)b∆).
When we evaluate it at b = 0:
Ξ|b=0 =
1
ρ
{y − rC − r∆}
(r + λ)∆
{(wmin + λρ∆)− (y − rC)}
{(y − rC)− γ (wmin + λρ∆)}
We then evaluate Ξ at the highest possible value of the minimum wage compatible with pro-
duction in the world without temporary contracts (i.e., evaluated at wmin = y − rC − bF ) :
Ξ|b=0 (wmin = y − rC − bF ) =
1
ρ
r + λρ
(r + λ)
> 1
Given that Ξ is monotonously increasing in wmin and continuous in b, it follows that
1. There exists a wage w∗ (b = 0) such that Ξ|b=0 (w) > 1 ∀w ∈ (w∗, y − rC + λρ∆− bF ].
2. There exist a set of values of b with positive mass for which:
w∗ (b) ∈ (y − rC − λρ∆− (1− γ)b∆, y − rC − bF ).
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7.7 Proof that in equilibrium NSCT and NSCP are both binding
Result 8. It is not possible that neither the NSCT nor the NSCP do not hold.
Proof. Output would be zero, thus no firm would be created.
Result 9. When confronted with the equilibrium environments described in Results 4 and 5, no
firm would oﬀer a contract where the NSCP holds but the NSCT does not.
Proof. Presumibly the firm could obtain profits by delaying the arrival to the permanent state.
Workers could be paying to the firm while in the temporary state, and start producing in the
permanent one, the extra profits being obtained by the fees paid (by workers) in the temporary
phase. The value of a firm in the permanent state is the same as in the equilibrium (as it pays the
eﬃciency wage and the worker works).
This can not be an equilibrium as in the temporary stage workers are already be paid the
minimum possible wage (w˜min). Thus, the stream of profits in the temporary phase has to be
smaller than in the equilibrium. An smaller stream of profits in the temporary phase, and equal in
the permanent phase must mean that the value of the firm is smaller than its value if oﬀering the
equilibrium contract
Result 10. When confronted with the equilibrium environments described in Results 4 and 5, no
firm would oﬀer a contract where the NSCT holds but the NSCP does not.
Proof. Presumably the firm could obtain profits by reducing the payments in the permanent phase,
even at the cost of stopping production.
Eﬀectively, this would amount to (1) either close the firm at the permanent stage or (2) ensure
the worker an utility VU in the permanent stage (so that he is willing not to break the match at
that point).
If the firm is closed at the permanent stage, there would be no renewal rate that would
be compatible with NSCT, as remember that the incentive condition at the temporary-phase is
λRQ (VP − VU ) ≥ e, and in this case VP = VU . Thus, there would be no production and the value
of the firm would be zero instead of C, so it would not be oﬀered.
If the worker is kept in the firm (albeit unproductive) but ensuring him a value VU , we are in
the same case, as no renewal rate could induce the worker to produce in the first stage.
Result 11. If NSCT and NSCP both hold, then they are both binding.
Proof. If NSCP is holding, then it is binding, as from equations (8) and (7), is clear that JT is
increasing in (JP − JT ), and (JP − JT ) is decreasing in wP , so the firm chooses the smallest wP
and the NSCP binds.
Remember from result 5 that whenever in steady state there is unemployment, JP < C = JT .
Thus, JT is decreasing in R, and the minimum value of R compatible with NSCT is R = ρ, so
NSCT binds.
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7.8 Proof that in the two-tier system to oﬀer directly a permanent contract is
not an equilibrium strategy.
Result 12. When confronted with the equilibrium environments described in Results 4 and 5, no
firm would oﬀer directly a permanent contract to an unemployed.
Proof. If they did, they would need to pay at least the eﬃciency wage, thus the value of the firm
would not be smaller than C (JP is already smaller than C), so it is strictly better to oﬀer the
equilibrium contract.
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